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SPECIAL FEATURE
THE NAPSTER LITIGATION
Introduction:
From Sheet Music to MP3 Files-
A Brief Perspective on Napster
BY HAROLD R. WEINBERG*
I.
he Napster case is the current cause cdlabre of the digital age.
The story has color. It involves music-sharing technology
invented by an eighteen-year-old college dropout whose high
school classmates nicknamed him "The Napster" on account of his
perpetually kinky hair.2 The story has drama. Depending on your perspec-
tive, it pits rapacious big music companies against poor and hardworking
students who just want to enjoy some tunes; or it pits creative and
industrious music companies seeking a fair return on their invested effort,
time, and money against greedy and irreverent music thieves. And the case
has importance. Music maybe intellectual property's "canary in the digital
coal mine" because the copyright infiingement issues now confronting the
"Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College
of Law.
IA&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
2 Karl Taro Greenfeld, Meet the Napster, TIME, Oct. 2, 2000, at 60, 63.
3 The plaintiffs in Napster are engaged in the commercial recording, distri-
bution, and sale of copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings.
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011. Although certainly not Napster's only users, students,
especially college students, represent Napster's most import group of consumers.
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 909 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
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music industry have important implications for other producers of digital
information products including books and movies.4
I will not use this space to discuss the Napster case in depth. That
analysis is provided elsewhere in this issue.5 Instead, I would like to briefly
place Napster within the broad sweep of copyright law as it has applied to
music over the last 170 years. Copyright always has been "technology's
child."6 The Napster case, while the latest big thing of the digital age, is
just one of many judicial and legislative adaptations of music-related
copyright law to technological innovation.7
II.
The Constitution provides Congress with the power "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."8 Congress first provided protection for musical compositions
in 1831, forty-one years after it enacted the United States' first copyright
statute which protected only maps, charts, and books.' The 1831 law
protected musical compositions printed on paper using score and staff
notation."l Sheet music publishing became commercially important to-
4 COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD NATIONAL RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 76-77 (2000).
5See Shawn Chapman, Note, Pushing the Limits ofCopyright Law and Upping
the Ante in the Digital World: The Strange Case ofA&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 89 KY. L.J. 793 (2001); Ryan C. Edwards, Note, Who Said Nothing in This
World is Free? A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.: Problems Presented,
Solutions Explored and-Answers Posed, 89 KY. L.J. 835 (2001).
6 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKE Box 27 (1994).
' Copyright law has adapted to technological innovation in many other fields
as well. A judicial example: the Supreme Court decided that the copyright on a
book extended to a movie version of that book. Kalem v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S.
55 (1911) (the "Ben-Hur" case). A legislative example: Congress ultimately
defined the copyright liability of cable television systems that retransmit over-the-
air broadcasts. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1976) (most recently
amended 1999).
8 U.S. CoNST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
9 EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INTELLECrUAL PRODUCTIONS
IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 89-90 (1879).
'10 d at 175-76.
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wards the end of the nineteenth century." The printing press made it
possible to reproduce and vend sheet music on a large scale, but that is
another story.'
2
m.
By 1908, piano rolls and the player pianos that played them were
commercially successful technologies. In White-Smith Music Publishing
Co. v. Apollo Co., the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether
the copyright in amusical composition printed as sheet music was infiinged
by an unauthorized reproduction of the same composition in piano rolls.'4
White-Smith, a sheet music publisher and the copyright holder, argued that
its copyright protected the intellectual conception of the musical composi-
tion against unauthorized reproduction in piano rolls or any other means of
expressing the order of the collection of musical notes composing the
composition. Apollo, a manufacturer of piano rolls and player pianos,
conceded that copyright law was intended to reward mental creation;
however, it argued that the copyright statute protected only music
expressed on paper. 5
The Court viewed the issue as one of statutory construction, and
concluded that a copy of a musical composition is a record of it written or
printed in visually intelligible symbols. Testimony in the case established
that even persons skilled in the making of piano rolls were unable to read
the musical compositions incorporated into the rolls. 6 Therefore, these
mechanical devices enabling musical sounds to be heard by listeners were
not copies under the then-current copyright act. White-Smith also suggested
in dictum that the copyright in a musical composition would not be
infringed if the composition were incorporated into a phonograph cylinder
I EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 32 (2000).
' 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 39-40.
"3 Music rolls consisted of perforated paper sheets which were passed over
ducts connected with the operating parts of a player piano. The ducts were kept
sealed until, by means of the perforations in the rolls, air pressure was admitted to
the ducts which operated pneumatic devices to sound musical notes. The
perforations were arranged so that the effect was to produce the melody for which
the roll had been cut. White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 9-
10 (1908). Music rolls were the subject of patents. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No.
736,228 (issued Aug. 11, 1903).
'4 White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 9-10.
151d at 11.
16Id at 18.
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or record capable of audibly reproducing the composition when played on
a phonograph.
17
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes concurred in White-Smith's holding,
but clearly was unhappy with the result.18 He preferred a more expansively
contoured copyright:
A musical composition is a rational collocation of sounds apart from
concepts, reduced to a tangible expression from which the collocation can
be reproduced either with or without continuous human intervention. On
principle anything that mechanically reproduces that collocation of sounds
ought to be held a copy, or if the statute is too narrow ought to be made
so by a firther act...."
In 1909, Congress agreed with JusticeHolmes andprovided composers
with the exclusive right to mechanical reproductions of their copyrighted
musical compositions."0 When considering the mechanical reproduction
right, Congress was concerned that a single manufacturer of piano rolls
might monopolize the piano roll market by acquiring a large share of all
composers' mechanical reproduction rights. Therefore, Congress also
enacted a compulsory license insuring that if a copyright holder licensed
the mechanical reproduction right for a musical composition, then
competitors of the licensee would be entitled to lawfully make mechanical
reproductions of the same work by paying a statutory royalty. 1
1 d. at 13. The opinion cited Steam v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562 (D.C. Cir.
1901), where the court stated that "[i]t is not pretended that the marking upon
waxed cylinders can be made out by the eye or that they can be utilized in any
other way than as parts of the mechanism ofaphonograph." White-Smith, 209 U.S.
at 12 (citingStearn, 17App.D.C. at 562). White-Smith also suggested thatafederal
statutory copyright in a musical composition was not infringed when the
composition was incorporated into the toothed metal cylinders employed in music
boxes. Id. at 13.
" One commentator describes Holmes' opinion in White-Smith and other early
copyright cases (including Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917) discussed
in Part IV of this Article) as "brilliant" in adapting copyright to new twentieth-
century technologies. GOLDSTEiN, supra note 6, at 38, 60-61.
19 White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 19-20.
20 Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1909) (repealed 1976).
21 Id. § 1(e). See generally Sidney A. Diamond, Sound Recordings andPhono-
records: History and Current Law, 1979 ILL. L.F. 337, 361. This compulsory
license still exists. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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IV.
The development of radio also provided new technological challenges
for copyright law.21 One important question was whether the radio
broadcast of a live performance of a copyrighted musical composition
violated the copyright holder's exclusive right to perform the composition
"publicly for profit."23 M Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co.
addressed this issue in 1923.24 The defendant Bamberger operated a large
department store in which it sold merchandise including radio equipment.
It also operated WOR, a licensed radio station broadcasting concerts and
other entertainment. The plaintiff alleged that Bamberger performed or
caused to be performed the plaintiff's copyrighted musical composition by
means of live singing from WOR and that this performance was public and
for profit. The department store denied that the broadcast was for profit
because everything it broadcast was transmitted without any cost to radio
listeners.
In deciding for the plaintiff copyright holder, theM. Witmark court was
strongly influenced by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' recent opinion in
Herbert v. The Shanley Company.25 There, the alleged copyright infringer
operated a public restaurant in which instrumental and vocal music was
I The word "radio" refers to the radiation and detection of signals that are
transmitted in the form of electromagnetic waves picked up by areceiving antenna.
Audio information such as the music on an analog record or audio tape is
superimposed on an electromagnetic carrier wave. The electric signals are
converted back into audible sounds by the radio. See JOHN S. RIGDENPHYSICS AND
THE SOUND OF Music 282-92 (2d ed. 1985). Entertainment radio broadcasting
commenced in the United States in 1920.15THENEwENCYCLOPEDIABRITANNICA
423,427 (1978).
23 Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (repealed 1976) (describing the
exclusive right "[tio perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a
musical composition"). Cases also arose concerning whether the radio broadcast
of a previously-recorded performance of a musical composition required
authorization by the holder of the copyright in the composition. Compare RCA
Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding, per Judge Learned
Hand, that any right in a recorded performance ends with the sale of the record),
with Waring v. WDAS Broad. Station, 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937) (holding that
performers have property rights in their recorded performances and may seek
injunctive relief). The law protecting sound recordings is discussed inPartV of this
Article.
M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776 (D.N.I. 1923).
z Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917).
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performed by paid performers for the entertainment of the restaurant's
patrons. No admission fee was charged. The holder of a copyrighted
musical composition claimed that the restaurant's performances of the
composition were for profit and, therefore, infringed its rights. Justice
Holmes, again preferring a robust copyright, held for the copyright holder:
If the rights underthe copyright are infringed only by aperformance where
money is taken at the door they are very imperfectly protected. Perfor-
mances not different in kind from those of the [defendant restaurant] ...
could be given that might compete with and even destroy the success ofthe
monopoly that the law intends [the plaintiffcopyright holder] ... to have. It
is enough to say that there is no need to construe the statute so narrowly. The
... performances are not eleemosynary ... Ifmusic did notpay it would be
given up. If itpays it pays out of the public's pocket Whether it pays or not
the purpose of employing it is profit and that is enough.
Justice Holmes' reasoning concerning the restaurant performances
easily applied to the department store's broadcasts in M. Witrark2 ' The
department store was operated to earn a profit, and the cost of the
broadcasts was charged against the general costs of operating the store.
Furthermore, in order to develop its business, the store broadcast its name
and the slogan "One of America's Great Stores" at the beginning and end
of every program.28 There may have been some validity to the department
store's argument that its broadcasts enhanced sales of sheet music
containing musical compositions performed during the broadcasts.29 Even
if so, this benefit could not legally excuse the store's infringement of the
copyright holder's exclusive right to perform its musical composition
publicly for profit.
V.
Analog phonograph and audio tape technology provide means to
capture performances of musical compositions performed by vocalists or
26 M Witmarkg 291 F. at 777-78 (quoting Herbert, 242 U.S. at 595). The M.
Witmark court also was influenced by Harms v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276 (D.C. Pa.
1922), which held that a pianist's playing of a copyrighted musical composition in
a motion picture theater infringed the copyright in the composition. M. Witmark,
291 F. at 778.
27 M Witmark, 291 F. at 779.
28Id.
29 Id. at 779-80.
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musicians. 30 Although commonplace today, these technologies were once
considered revolutionary. As the Supreme Court noted:
In earlier times, a performing artist's work was largely restricted to the
stage; once performed, it remained "recorded" only in the memory of
those who had... heard it. Today, we can record that performance in
precise detail and reproduce it again and again with utmost fidelity.3'
The Court recognized that performers contribute something creative above
and beyond the contribution of the author of the underlying musical
composition that is performed.32 In a sense, a musical composition,
although capable of supporting its own copyright, is "incomplete" until
performing artists interpret and transform it into audible sounds.
33
Authorized recordings of performances of musical compositions early
and often were copied or performed publicly without authorization.
34
Unauthorized copies of audio-taped performances became an especially
serious problem because a "pirate" could purchase a single authorized tape
containing a popular song, duplicate it in quantity, and then sell copies to
the public.35 The pirate's costs virtually were de minimis when compared
with the costs of producing the authorized taped performance that the pirate
copied.36 Initially, recorded performances were protected, if at all, under
state unfair competition case law or legislation specifically directed at
30Basic analog recoding technology dates back to Thomas Edison's nineteenth-
century invention of the phonograph. See SAMUELS, supra note 11, at 33, 45-47.
When performed live, music exists in analog form as waves in the air. Analog
music recordings fix the musical sounds into a continuous machine-readable form.
For example, vinyl records store music in a continuous wavy groove cut into the
surface of the record. A phonograph converts the information contained in the
groove into audible music. Analog audio tapes store music as a continuous
magnetic signal which "follows" the audio signal of the music being recorded. A
tape player converts the magnetic symbol back into an audible acoustical signal.
RIGDEN, supra note 22, at 262-65, 274-76.
31 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,570 (1971).
32 Id. at 550-51.
33 Waring v. WDAS Broad. Station, 194 A. 631, 635 (Pa. 1937).
34 See, e.g., Fonotipia Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 F. 951, 955-56 (C.C.E.D.N.Y.
1909), overruled inpart by G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir.
1952).
31 See generally Diamond, supra note 21, at 337,349.
36 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 546, 549-5 1.
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unauthorized copying.37 Spurred by the need to deal with pirated audio
tapes, Congress enacted the first federal law outlawing record and tape
piracy in 1972. 3s
The current copyright statute protects "sound recordings" which result
from the fixation of musical sounds in material objects such as analog disks
or tapes. 39 The statute labels these material objects "phonorecords.'" The
sound-recording copyright includes the exclusive right to reproduce the
sound recording, and is separate from the copyright in the underlying
musical composition animated by the performing artists who recorded the
composition. The underlying composition and any accompanying words is
referred to as a "musical work."'41 Both sound recordings and musical
works must be original to qualify for copyright protection.42 However,
I Misappropriation was the common law cause of action most frequently
employed against pirates. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §
38 cmt. c (1995). Many states also enacted statutes directed atrecord or tape piracy.
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 434.445 (1992) (making record or tape piracy a
class D felony). Goldstein established that these statutes are not preempted by
federal law. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 546.
3 Congress enacted the SoundRecording Amendment of 1971, which amended
the Copyright Act of 1909 and became effective in 1972. 17 U.S.C. § 5(n) (1971)
(repealed 1976). See generally Diamond, supra note 21, at 337,345-51.
39 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The Copyright Act also prohibits
the unauthorized fixation of the sounds of live musical performances. Id. § 1101
(1994).
o Phonorecords are "material objects in which sounds... are fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device." Id. § 101.
411d. § 102(a)(2) (1994). A composer can obtain a copyright in a musical work
merely by recording it. Id. § 102(a). This changes prior federal copyright law
which, influenced by the White-Smith case discussed in Part m of this Article,
required that music be reduced to a visually-readable form in order to obtain
federal copyright protection. See generally 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.05[A]
(2000).
42 Copyright protection subsists in "original works of authorship ... [including
sound recordings and musical works] fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."
17 U.S.C. § 102(a). In general, originality sufficientto support a copyright requires
independent creation plus a modicum of creativity. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1990).
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment
in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is
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originality for each work does not provide identical copyrights. The holder
of the copyright in a sound recording does not control the recording's
public performance; that right belongs to the holder of the copyright in the
underlying musical work.43
The record company plaintiffs in the Napster case claimed infringe-
ment of their copyrights both in sound recordings and in musical works.'
An interesting question is whether a record producer can make a suffi-
ciently original contribution to a sound recording (perhaps by editing the
recorded sounds) to qualify as an author ofthat work entitled to a copyright
along with the artists performing the musical work being recorded. There
is some authority that record producers might acquire author status.
4s
However, even if they do not, record companies can become copyright
holders by contractual assignments or other means.4
VI.
The "digital revolution" had a significant impact on music-related
copyright law even prior to the Internet, MP3 files, and the Napster case.47
The advent of digital recording in compact disks (CDs) was in itself a
momentous technological development.4 It eliminated many of the
problems inherent in analog records or tapes, and provided other improve-
ment as well. For example, background noise is virtually eliminated from
digitally-recorded music, which also has greater fidelity to the recorded
performance. 9
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
43 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4), 114 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
"A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,1010-11 (9th Cir. 2001).
4
1 See NIMMER, supra note 41, § 2.10[A][2][b].
46 17 U.S.C. § 201(b), (d) (1994).
47 Digital compression technology makes it possible to store audio recordings
in a digital format that may be uploaded and downloaded over the Internet MP3
is the digital format employedbyNapster users to store compressed audio files. See
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011.
48 RIGDEN, supra note 22, at 337. Digital recording translates the analog sound
waves of a performance into binary numbers. These numbers may be encoded on
an audio compact disk in the form of a series pits that, when "read" by a laser beam
and light sensitive detector, are converted into an electrical signal and then into an
analog signal that can drive speakers producing analog sound waves audible to
humans. Id. at 338-42.
49 Id. at 337.
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There have been multiple legal efforts to adapt music-related copyright
law to digital recording. For example, in 1984 Congress amended the
copyright act to prohibit the unauthorized for profit rental ofCDs and other
phonorecords embodying sound recordings or musical works.50 This
legislation responded to record stores that facilitated unauthorized copying
by simultaneously renting music CDs and selling blank analog recording
tape to consumers who would record the CD by employing a CD player and
an analog tape recorder.51 Subsequently, Congress enacted the Audio Home
Recording Act of 1992.52 It responded to new digital recording technology
enabling consumers to make nearly perfect digital copies of music fixed in
CDs or analog media.' The act permits commercializing the technology for
use in limited and infringement-free home digital copying, and creates a
royalty system compensating holders of copyrights in sound recordings and
musical works. The royalties are paid by manufacturers and importers of
digital audio-recording equipment and blank digital recording media.
The Internet represents threekeytechnological advances: the increased
use of information in digital form including digitized music, the rapid
increase of computer networks, and the emergence of the World Wide
Web.-' When information is in digital form, it is not possible to access the
information by computer without making a copy, even if only a short-lived
copy briefly resident in the computer's temporary memory or shown on the
screen of its monitor. This is highly significant because copyright law
historically distinguishes access from copying and seeks an appropriate
50 See 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
5 This amendment created an exception to the general rule (often referred to as
the "first sale doctrine") that lawful owners of phonorecords are free to sell or
otherwise dispose of them without authorization by any copyright owner. See
generally MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW §§ 8.14- 8.15
(3d ed. 1999).
52 Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998).
53 See generally LEAFFER, supra note 51, § 8.30.
54 COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD NATIONAL RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 28. Computer networks enable the sending of
information around the world inexpensively and almost instantaneously. Id. at 4.
The World Wide Web is a vast collection of interconnected electronic documents
employing hypertext. In a hypertext document, if the user wants more information
about a particular subject mentioned, he or she merely clicks on a hypertext link to
almost instantaneously obtain the information. Hypertext links documents by
different authors, and the documents may consist of digitized text, audio, video, or
graphics. Id. at 39.
[VOL. 89
ABREF PERSPECTIVE ONNAPSTER
balance between them. This distinction is not so easily drawn in a digital
environment:
One of the essential elements of copyright-the right to control
reproduction-works as expected in the world oftraditional media, where
there is an obvious distinction between access and reproduction andwhere
the copyright owner's control of reproduction provides just that. But in
the digital world, where no access is possible exceptby copying, complete
control of copying would mean complete control of access as well.55
The Napster case is about the proper balance between control of digitized
music and access to it in the Internet environment.
56
VII.
And what of The Napster himself, who began this stoiy? A recent
report has him, now all of twenty years old, publicly defending Napster,
Inc.'s efforts to protect its copyright in the computer code for its music-
sharing technology.57 Such is life in copyright's fast lane.
5 I1d. at31.
56 Congress also is addressing this new technological environment. For ex-
ample, the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act limits the copyright infringe-
ment liability of Internet online service providers such as America Online. See
generally Justin Williamson, Note, Online Service Provider Copyight Liability:
Is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act the Answer?, 88 KY. L.J. 987 (2000).
57Ted Bridis et al., Digits, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2001, at B7.
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